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I never met the Harvard political philosopher John Rawls, who died on November 24, 
2002, at the age of 81.  But as someone teaching and writing about political theory 
over the past few years I am, like hundreds of others, exploring terrain which he did 
more to shape than any other theorist of the past century or more.  His influence is not 
always easy to trace; political theory in 2003 is an umbrella term for highly diverse 
debates from globalisation to multiculturalism to nationalism, and Rawls’s influence 
is evident in the rejection as much as in the embrace of his style and framework.  
However, few would begrudge his singular reputation.  His masterpiece, A Theory of 
Justice (1971), is a monumental work of grand theory offering a vision of the just 
society that is pursued in relentless depth.  Its sheer scope, ambition and attention to 
detail set it apart from English-language political theory as practiced for many years 
previously, among liberals at least. 
 
The importance and influence of Rawls’s work is much debated.  Rawls did little to 
promote his ideas; by all accounts he was a reserved and modest man, preferring the 
quiet life of a philosophy scholar to public or policy advocacy.   Though he recast 
political theory his critics are legion, from the right and the left, feminists and 
‘communitarians’ and multiculturalists.  It is often said that he had much less 
influence on political parties and public policy – in the real political world, in other 
words.  But here too the picture is uneven.  His legacy, for the liberal left in particular, 
may come to rest more in the evocative symbols he bequeaths than particular policy 
prescriptions.  That may sound dismissive, but the symbolic power and attraction of 
his vision of society as a system of social co-operation among equals may yet prove a 
counterweight to the micro-managed and marketised world of New Labour. 
 
 
1. Breaking the mould? 
 
To assess his legacy, we need to appreciate just how dramatically Rawls changed the 
contours of political theory.  Normative theories that  address the legitimacy of state 
power and action – the big ‘ought’ questions of politics, and not just the descriptive 
‘is’ ones – were in crisis before A Theory of Justice.  Prominent figures lamented that 
the late 1950s and early 1960s that large-scale political philosophy was ‘dead’.  
Others celebrated this apparent demise; the heirs of the ‘ordinary language’ school 
were bemused by the idea of grand system-building and sought to concentrate on 
exploring the common uses and meanings of terms like justice, equality, freedom and 
rights. 
 
A Theory of Justice challenged head-on these claims and suspicions.  Rawls criticised 
‘intuitionism’, the idea that we can figure out what (e.g.) equality means by 
interrogating our intuitive thoughts about it in enough depth.  Less directly he 
challenged Marxist claims that markets wholly undermined equality.  Most clearly, 
however, Rawls attacked his main liberal opponents, the utilitarians, for not taking 
rights seriously.  According to Rawls, utilitarians would be happy with an overall 
increase in utility or happiness in society, even if its distribution was terribly uneven 
and many people could not share in it (or worse, were exploited to produce greater 
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utility for others).  He argued that: ‘In a just society the rights secured by justice are 
not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests’1  In other 
words, governments and citizens were constrained by rights that must be respected 
even if ignoring them were beneficial in other ways.  Or as the philosophers put it, the 
right has priority over the good.   
 
At the core of Rawls’s theory were the two principles of justice: 
 
(1) each person is to have the equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others 
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
 
This looks complex, but at one level it is not.  The first principle holds that we should 
be free as possible to set the course of our own lives.  Rawls is, after all, a liberal.  
The bottom line was about individual people and their freedom to live their lives as 
they choose.  There was no higher value than liberty.   
 
The intensely debated key part of the second principle is the need to make inequalities 
work to the benefit of the least advantaged (or the ‘worst off’).  This is Rawls’s 
famous ‘difference principle’.  The core idea is this: social and economic inequalities 
are not wrong, or bad, in themselves.  They only become indefensible when they 
don’t operate to improve the position of the worst off (such as those on the lowest 
incomes).  In the economics-driven jargon, we have to ‘maximin’ – maximise the 
minimum payoff.  Rawls views society as a large-scale experiment in social co-
operation.  The luck and the talents of the better off – including their genetic talents, 
which are just a mater of chance and are not exactly ‘deserved’ – can be used to 
improve their own wealth and position.  If this were not allowed, if we were to take a 
more radical, levelling egalitarian approach, then according to Rawls individuals 
would have few incentives to innovate, to create wealth.  But, he argued, this is only 
acceptable up to a point.  As long as those in the worst off positions are benefiting as 
well , then inequalities can be just.   
 
Having principles is fine, of course, but why should we accept these ones?  Rawls was 
in no doubt that we all would and should accept them.  The two principles do not just 
come out of the blue.  Rawls argues that they would be chosen in an original position 
behind a veil of ignorance.  The original position is more-or-less Rawls’s version of 
the much older ‘state of nature’ of famous contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau.  It is an imaginary place, an ‘initial position’, outside society, where a 
group of people meet, in order to define ‘the fundamental terms of their association’ – 
or, how their society should be shaped and run.  People in the original position are 
behind a veil of ignorance: they don’t know their age, class, race, religion, or any 
other particular facts about themselves.  They are choosing, self-interested people, but 
stripped down to their human essence.  In this odd, hypothetical position, behind the 
veil, Rawls asks: what principles would they (you, me) choose to govern the basic 
structure of society? 
 
                                                 
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.4. 
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The trick behind the original position and the veil of ignorance is that, because we are 
stripped of our particular identities, we are forced to choose for everyone (or – for 
anyone we might be).  Self-interest is made to work for the common good.  By using 
the position and the veil, writes Rawls, ‘One excludes the knowledge of those 
contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their 
prejudices’2  The circumstances of the choosing make the ultimate choices – for his 
two principles - fair and impartial.  Rawls assumes that these rational people (that is, 
all of us) would prioritise freedom of speech, expression, worship, and so on (the first 
principle), but that we would also want to guard against our being at the bottom of the 
social and economic heap by making sure the rich can only get richer if the poor also 
benefit in the process. 
 
That is the gist of his theory of justice.  The theory has benerated so much debate that 
thousands of articles have been written subjecting every small element in this 
argument to forensic examination.  But the big picture is this: in 1971, this was a 
tremendously and unusually ambitious attempt to get to the root of what justice means 
and why we should accept a just society along these lines.  Referring to Rawls’s 
revival of the idea that ‘a person has a dignity and worth that social structures should 
not be permitted to violate’, Chicago philosopher Martha Nussbaum writes that 
‘Thirty years after publication of A Theory of Justice, with all the discussion of rights 
and pluralism that has ensued, it is easy to forget that a whole generation of our 
political and moral philosophers had virtually stopped talking about that idea, and 
about how it can guide a religiously and ethnically diverse society like our own’3 
 
I have concentrated on A Theory of Justice, but Rawls has published other books 
since then, most notably Political Liberalism (1993).4  In this book, Rawls defends 
his theory of justice as ‘political not metaphysical’.  He moves to a view where people 
in a society may have ‘comprehensive doctrines’, such as religious convictions, whic
are incompatible with others’ similar doctrines.  But still we have to live together.  So 
placing limits on how people reason in public is important – they should not argue 
from within their comprehensive doctrines, but rather offer arguments that others can 
reasonably agree with.  In that way, one might be able to achieve an ‘overlapping 
consensus’ among adherents to different comprehensive doctrines. 
h 
                                                
 
Political Liberalism seemed to be different to A Theory of Justice – more political, 
grounded, realistic, accepting pluralism of faith and belief more fully.  It put the 
original position to one side, as just one way among legitimate others of finding one’s 
way into public reason, and seemed less ambitious, addressed as it was only to those 
already living in liberal democratic societies.  Certainly some liberal political theorists 
were dismayed.  Brian Barry, reviewing Political Liberalism, wrote that ‘I believe 
that the first time Rawls got it roughly right, and that the line he pursues in the new 
book is thoroughly misguided’.5  My own view is that, despite surface appearances, 
little really changed in Rawls’s theory from the first to the second book, and that 
critics who assumed otherwise were paying too much attention to changes in wording 
and not enough to deeper continuities of structure.  For example, debate in the ‘public 
 
2 TJ, 19 
3 M. Nussbaum, ‘The Enduring Significance of John Rawls’, in The Chronicle of Higher Education, 20 
July 2001 
4 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993. 
5 B. Barry, ‘Good For Us, but Not For Them, The Guardian, 14 August 1993. 
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political forum’ in Political Liberalism seems different from the original position of 
the earlier book, but he or she is similarly restricted in the type of arguments that can 
be put forward to others.6   
 
 
2. Influence and importance 
 
The influence of A Theory of Justice on political ideas has been uneven.  Anglo-
American liberal political philosophy was reshaped by it – Rawls’s book set the 
parameters for debate from the moment it was published.  Prominent philosophers in 
that tradition have been fulsome in their tributes to Rawls; Thomas Scanlon of 
Harvard says that Rawls’s work ‘revived and reshaped the entire field, and its 
profound influence on the way justice is understood and argued about will last long 
into the future’.  Joshua Cohen of MIT says that Rawls ‘wouldn’t have gone in for 
rankings, but his work has a place among the greatest tradition of moral and political 
philosophy that would include Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau’.7   
 
In the political world itself, Rawls’s influence is more uncertain, and difficult to 
detect.  His brand of ‘left wing liberalism’ may have seemed radically welfarist in the 
US, but much of continental Europe, with established collectivist traditions and 
widely-accepted welfare state provision, could view his ideas as rather mainstream.  
There is little evidence of direct influence on US Supreme court decisions or on 
Democratic Party ideology or policy – especially into the Clinton era.  The 
establishment of the Social Democratic Party in the early 1980s in the UK led to a 
flurry of interest in Rawls’s ideas.  Former Labour deputy leader Roy Hattersley has 
been most prominent in discussing Rawls in mainstream UK politics, and claiming for 
him a place at the centre of Labour thinking.  But A Theory of Justice has been 
translated into more than 25 languages, and it has been said to have been influential 
among some Chinese dissident groups.  That should be no surprise.  As Rawls argued, 
‘The limitation of liberty is justified only when it is necessary for liberty itself’8). 
 
  
3. The critics 
 
Even Rawls’s admirers are his critics.  The libertarian right were upset by his 
difference principle apparently forcing the better off to work for others without their 
consent – a sort of inverse wage slavery.  Feminists have criticised the way in which 
he has apparently taken the institution of the family as natural, overlooking injustices 
that can arise for individuals within families.  Critics who more recently stress the 
importance of recognising social and cultural difference wonder, on a philosophical 
level, if the ‘person’ in the original position is really a person at all, so stripped are 
they of all the particularities that make them who the are in the first place.  
Communitarians criticise the abstract individualism of Rawls’s theory, arguing that 
we draw our sense of self from the localities and communities we inhabit, and that we 
possess no ‘essence’ beyond that.   
 
                                                 
6 M. Saward, ‘Rawls and Deliberative Democracy’, in M. Passerin d’Entreves (ed.), Democracy as 
Public Deliberation (Manchester University Press 2002). 
7 ‘Rawls Remembered’, in The Philosophy Magazine, Issue 22, 2003, p.34. 
8 A Theory of Justice, p.28. 
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On the left there is a good deal of argument about just how egalitarian Rawls’s theory 
is.  Clearly the difference principle supports a quite extensive welfare state funded 
through general taxation and designed to operate to the benefit of those in the most 
vulnerable socio-economic positions.  At the same time, the acceptance of some 
inequalities, along with the priority accorded to individual liberty and the clear 
acceptance of the market society made many on the left suspicious.  This ambiguity 
led to his use by both sides in debates from the 1980s over the ‘crisis of the welfare 
state’ across Europe.  As Cecile Laborde has written, ‘Rawls’s emphasis on the 
priority of liberty and on the acceptability of inequality provided ammunition to those 
“neo-liberals” arguing for welfare cuts and market-based policies … while his 
rehabilitation of distributive justice, by contrast, was attractive to those within the 
post-Marxist or non-Marxist left who sought to reconcile egalitarianism with 
economic liberalism’9 .  But the Blairite left (or perhaps ‘right’), along with Clinton 
Democrats and many other European social democratic parties, have different 
agendas to that of Rawls.  As Ben Rogers has written, left-of-centre parties and 
governments across the west ‘speak the language of community, not of individual 
rights; of equality of opportunity, rather than equality of outcome; of desert rather 
than the difference principle’10 
 
 
4. A legacy for the left? 
 
The sheer scope and richness of Rawls’s work will no doubt secure its future 
influence.  As with other classics of political theory, it will prove to be a source of 
insight and inspiration for new political concerns and challenges.  For example, one of 
the basic arguments of A Theory of Justice is that we do not deserve our genetic 
inheritance; it’s just a matter of chance.  Therefore, we do not have a right to benefit 
from exploiting our genetic advantages.  Maybe it is reasonable, even desirable, to 
manipulate the genetic makeup of unborn babies?  This is not an argument Rawls 
anticipated, but we are now making decisions about  the uses of relevant technologies.   
Being very selective and speaking from a broadly left-liberal perspective, I would 
single out three broader possibilities, in no particular order. 
 
First, although it has been sidelined in more recent work, by Rawls as well as by his 
commentators, the original position continues to offer a beguiling image of an ideal 
decision making procedure embodying openness, equality, impartiality and 
inclusiveness.  Could it be approximated in the real political world?  The past ten 
years or so have seen a highly fruitful debate about ‘deliberative democracy’ – indeed 
Rawls declared himself a deliberative democrat in the late 1990s.11  Part of  that 
debate was about potential decision-making forums like citizens’ juries or deliberative 
polls, which bring together random samples of citizens and trusting them to make 
sense of issues and come to conclusions about them.  Perhaps such forums reflect 
real-world potential for the original position?  Could this hypothetical device provide 
a goal that might reinvigorate representative institutions that are widely seen as distant 
and lacking deep credibility?  Rawls wrote that:  “Of course, when we try to simulate 
the original position in everyday life … we will presumably find that our deliberations 
                                                 
9 C. Laborde, ‘The Reception of John Rawls in Europe’, in European Journal of Political Theory 1 (2). 
10 B. Rogers, ‘Portrait: John Rawls’, in Prospect, June 1999, p.55.  




and judgements are influenced by our special inclinations and attitudes” (TJ, 147).  
Quite so.  But even necessarily distant approximations might be vast improvements 
on current institutions. 
 
Second, as the swing of ideological fashion comes back round again and the benefits 
of positive public ownership of key services are articulated in the UK and elsewhere, 
the radical character and moral force of Rawls’s egalitarianism may serve as an 
ideological guide and inspiration. It seems to me that only those who would reject 
wholesale the market mechanism can regard Rawls’s difference principle as a feeble 
device that would do little to rectify significant social inequalities.  There will always 
been room for disagreement, but surely a Rawlsian state would be much less 
apologetic about not getting involved in the public/private partnership funding 
routine, would seek to control behaviour less and meet basic needs more, would fund 
health and education to levels comparable to the highest to be found elsewhere in 
Europe, and would at the same time be quite libertarian when it come to lifestyles and 
the recognition of cultural difference. 
 
And finally, underneath the decision-making procedures and the policy prescriptions, 
there is the Rawlsian vision of a society as a sphere of social cooperation, part of a 
world where we ‘value common institutions and activities as good in themselves.’ (TJ 
522).  An anodyne statement on one level, perhaps, but in privatising times it may 
stand as a symbol of profound and almost radical social vision.  Especially when we 
remind ourselves that, as Rawls wrote, ‘The social system is not an unchangeable 
order beyond human control but a pattern of human action’ (TJ, 102).  
 
